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campaigns.	 In	 this	 paper,	 I	 show	diffusion	 effects	 among	 the	 2005	Constitutional	 Treaty	 referendums.	
Spain,	 France,	 the	Netherlands,	 and	 Luxembourg	 used	 the	 referendum	method	 to	 ratify	 the	 European	
Constitution.	 Based	 on	 85	 interviews	 with	 campaigners	 in	 all	 four	 countries,	 I	 find	 that	 campaign	
arguments	and	 strategies	were	not	always	homegrown.	However,	 such	diffusion	 is	not	automatic	and	
depends	on	diffusion	channels.		
	
In	 2005,	 four	 European	Union	 (EU)	member	 states	 held	 referendums	on	whether	 to	 ratify	 the	 Treaty	
establishing	a	Constitution	for	Europe	(TCE),	in	chronological	order:	Spain,	France,	the	Netherlands,	and	
Luxembourg.	While	 these	 referendums	were	 seemingly	distinct	 from	one	another,	 identical	 campaign	
posters	 and	 arguments	were	 circulated	 across	 Europe.	 Diffusion	 is	 a	 process	 wherein	 new	 ideas	 and	
models	 of	 behavior	 spread	 geographically	 from	 a	 core	 site	 to	 other	 sites	 (Bunce	 et	 al.,	 2006).	While	
referendum	 campaigns	 have	 been	 studied	 thoroughly,	 such	 cross-case	 influences	 remain	 overlooked	
(e.g.	 Glencross	 et	 al.,	 2011;	 Qvortrup,	 2006).	 I	 show	 that	 campaign	 arguments	 were	 not	 always	






Instead	of	using	diffusion	processes	as	an	 independent	variable	and	trying	 to	 trace	 their	effect	on	the	
referendum	 results	 quantitatively	 (e.g.	 Collingwood	 et	 al.,	 2012),	 I	 treat	 diffusion	 as	 the	 dependent	
variable	 and	 detail	 social	 mechanisms	 that	 connect	 referendum	 campaigns	 through	 interview	 data.	
	 2	
What	are	 the	 factors	 that	 facilitate	 such	diffusion?	 In	 line	with	 the	expectations	of	 the	policy	 transfer	
and	 modular	 action	 literatures,	 I	 find	 that	 diffusion	 depends	 on	 the	 existence	 of	 channels	 such	 as	
collaborative	 networks,	 shared	 language	 and	 common	 media.	 Furthermore,	 based	 on	 85	 in-depth	




Below,	 I	 first	 review	the	 literature	on	 referendums	 to	highlight	 the	 importance	of	 referendum	
campaigns	 in	 shaping	 public	 opinion,	 which	 makes	 borrowing	 campaign	 arguments	 all	 the	 more	
important.	Next,	I	bring	together	the	policy	transfer	and	modular	action	literatures	and	discuss	the	paths	




The	 voting	 behavior	 literature	 suggests	 that,	 in	 most	 instances,	 referendum	 campaigns	 are	 more	
influential	than	election	campaigns	(e.g.	de	Vreese,	2007).	When	parties	line	up	in	a	non-traditional	way,	
or	the	issue	is	unfamiliar	to	the	mass	public,	referendum	campaigns	can	be	decisive	(LeDuc,	2002).	This	






closely	 to	understand	 the	 circumstances	under	which	 voters	 rely	on	EU	attitudes	 rather	 than	 second-
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order	effects	and	vice	versa	(e.g.	Garry	et	al.,	2005).	 In	the	most	comprehensive	comparative	study	so	







countries	 favored	 the	 TCE	 several	 months	 before	 the	 votes.1	 Yet	 the	 final	 referendum	 results	 varied	




Diffusion	 among	 referendum	 campaigns	 is	 therefore	 an	 important	 but	 neglected	 area	 of	
research.	Closa	(2007)	shows	that	the	governments	were	influenced	by	one	another	in	their	decisions	to	




Norway.	 The	 authors	 suggest	 that	 Norway	 rejected	 the	 treaty	mainly	 because	 the	 Norwegian	 Centre	









Austria,	 whereas	 the	 Nordic	 countries	 were	 much	 more	 interested	 in	 each	 other’s	 decisions.	 These	
findings	 not	 only	 point	 to	 the	 importance	 of	 interconnectedness	 among	 Nordic	 countries,	 but	 also	




Diffusion	 involves	a	 transmitter,	an	adopter,	an	 innovation	 that	 is	being	diffused,	and	a	channel	 along	
which	 the	 item	may	 be	 transmitted	 (Soule,	 2003).	My	 focus	 is	 the	 channels	 that	 transmit	 campaign-










(e.g.	 Ovodenko	 et	 al.,	 2012;	 Stone,	 2004;	 Weyland,	 2005).	 Similarly,	 the	 mass	 media	 coverage	 is	
important	 in	exchanging	 information	 from	one	government	 to	another	 (Braun,	2011;	Dolowitz,	1997).	
For	 instance,	 Linos	 (2011)	 shows	 that	 governments	 are	 more	 likely	 to	 imitate	 countries	 that	 are	
geographically,	 linguistically,	 and	 culturally	 proximate	 and	 thereby	 disproportionately	 covered	 in	 the	
news.		
	 5	
While	campaign	strategies	 is	not	a	conventional	focus	for	this	 literature,	Dolowitz	et	al.	 (1999)	
study	why	the	Labour	Party	in	the	United	Kingdom	borrowed	electoral	strategies	from	the	Democrats	in	
the	United	States.	The	authors	emphasize	 the	 importance	of	 the	common	 language	between	 the	 two	
states,	 the	 shared	 ideology	 among	 the	 parties,	 the	 personal	 relationships	 between	 the	 leaders,	 and	









This	 literature	 identifies	 three	 main	 channels.	 First,	 collaborative	 networks	 crossing	 national	
boundaries	promote	diffusion	(e.g.	Bunce	et	al.,	2006;	Tarrow,	2005).	These	networks	can	be	provided	
by	NGOs,	 civil	 society	 activists	 or	 other	more	established	 institutional	 frameworks.	Alternatively,	 they	
could	be	based	on	interpersonal	relations.	Studying	contention	in	the	UK	and	France	between	1730	and	
1848,	Rudé	 (1964)	 found	that	 information	about	rebellions	diffused	through	communication	networks	
of	travelers	along	transportation	routes.	Hedström	et	al.	(2000)	showed	similarly	that	between	1894	and	
1911	the	diffusion	of	the	Swedish	Social	Democratic	Party	was	an	unintended	by-product	of	the	political	





media	 served	 as	 a	 channel	 of	 diffusion	 by	 creating	 a	 cultural	 linkage	 between	 African	 Americans	 in	
different	metropolitan	areas	(Myers,	2000;	Soule,	2003;	Spilerman,	1976).	Tarrow	(2005)	suggests	that	
such	channels	 lead	 to	a	common	 ‘theorization’	across	boundaries,	where	a	matter	 is	defined	within	a	













As	 such,	 diffusion	 is	 the	 cooperation	 among	 campaigners	 in	 different	 countries	 and	 the	
subsequent	 adoption	 of	 campaign	 arguments	 elaborated	 elsewhere.	 The	 channels,	 in	 turn,	 are	 what	
determine	 the	 existence	 and	 level	 of	 such	 diffusion.	 Operationalizing	 the	 dependent	 variable	 and	
demonstrating	that	borrowing	occurred	is	difficult	as	similar	strategies	may	emerge	in	different	settings	
without	 clear	 lines	 of	 causality	 (Needham,	 2010,	 p.	 610).	 James	 and	 Lodge	 (2003)	 criticize	 the	 policy	
transfer	 approach	 for	 not	 sufficiently	 distinguishing	 borrowing	 from	 rational	 policymaking,	 rendering	




1999;	 Needham,	 2010).	 In	 this	 research,	 physical	 contacts	 such	 as	 participation	 in	 each	 other’s	
campaigns	 or	 in	 joint	 political	 events;	 discussions	 among	 the	 campaigners	 on	 campaign	 themes	 for	








the	 same	 urgency	 and	 thereby	 were	 not	 comparable.	 I	 conducted	 the	 field	 research	 between	 April-
December	2008	and	interviewed	campaigners	from	all	political	parties	and	civil	society	groups	that	were	
active	 in	 the	 campaign.	 These	 interviews	 were	 in	 English,	 French	 or	 Spanish,	 face-to-face,	 semi-
structured,	 and	 based	 on	 both	 opportunity	 and	 snowball	 sampling.	 I	 interviewed	 85	 campaigners:	 19	
from	 Spain,	 23	 from	 France,	 22	 from	 the	 Netherlands,	 and	 21	 from	 Luxembourg.	 Overall,	 32	 of	 the	
interviewees	were	campaigners	from	civil	society,	53	from	political	parties;	40	were	No	campaigners,	45	




In	 2005,	 campaigners	 in	 the	 four	 countries	 that	 held	 referendums	 on	 the	 TCE	 discussed	 campaign	
themes	 and	 borrowed	 arguments	 from	 one	 another.	 73	 out	 of	 85	 mentioned	 that	 they	 met	 with	
campaigners	 from	 the	 other	 countries:	 18	 in	 Spain,	 17	 in	 France,	 19	 in	 the	 Netherlands,	 19	 in	
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Luxembourg.	51	out	of	85	said	that	their	campaign	was	affected	by	the	other	campaigns:	11	in	Spain,	4	









Luxembourg	 speaks	 French,	 consumes	 French	 media	 channels	 and	 receives	 a	 substantial	 number	 of	
commuters	 from	France	 every	 day.	 Thus,	 the	 interaction	between	 France,	 Spain	 and	 the	Netherlands	
was	not	as	strong	as	that	between	France	and	Luxembourg.	This	interaction	was	so	dense	that	the	main	
Luxembourgish	No	campaigner,	the	left-wing	No	Committee,	took	its	lead	from	the	French	No	campaign.		
Detailed	 interview	data	shows	 that	collaborative	networks	 lead	 to	 ‘shallow’	diffusion	between	
campaigners,	 by	 connecting	 them	 and	 enabling	 them	 to	 discuss	 campaign	 themes.	 The	 addition	 of	 a	
shared	language	and	common	media	channels,	however,	generates	‘deep’	diffusion	among	campaigners	
and	 voters,	 by	 increasing	 the	 presence	 of	 campaign	 arguments	 in	 borrower	 states.	 Furthermore,	 this	
research	 finds	 that	 diffusion	 was	 not	 sequential.	 Because	 the	 debate	 in	 France	 started	 very	 early,	




2	 For	 further	 empirical	 evidence	 showing	 that	 French	 arguments	 appeared	 in	 the	 Luxembourgish	 campaign	 see	
(Dumont	et	al.,	2007).	
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Institutional	 networks	 were	 common	 to	 all	 four	 cases,	 and	 were	 mentioned	 in	 the	 interviews	 as	
important	 facilitators.	 These	 were	 namely	 the	 European	 Parliament	 (EP)	 groups,	 the	 European	 anti-
globalization	 network,	 and	 other	 ad	 hoc	 European	 networks.	 First,	 both	 the	 Yes	 and	No	 campaigners	
pointed	to	 the	EP	groups	and	parties	as	platforms	to	share	 ideas	with	other	similar	European	political	
parties.	This	formed	a	regular	meeting	opportunity,	where	most	of	the	campaigners	said	they	discussed	
campaign	 themes.	 Although	 these	 networks	 constituted	 a	 platform	 for	 political	 parties,	 the	 extent	 to	
which	 they	 were	 influential	 in	 shaping	 the	 campaigns	 is	 not	 uniform	 across	 the	 political	 spectrum.	
Interestingly,	 the	 far-left	 and	 far-right	 took	 extreme	 positions.	 The	 far-left	 mentioned	 close	 contacts	
with	other	far-left	parties	in	Europe,	whereas	far-right	parties	rejected	any	links	to	other	such	parties.		
To	 take	 an	 example,	 in	 the	 Netherlands,	 both	 the	 Yes	 and	 No	 campaigners	 (16	 out	 of	 22)	
mentioned	the	EP	groups	as	platforms	where	they	discussed	their	experiences.	International	Secretary	






The	 Dutch	 far-left	 Socialist	 Party	 (SP)	 mentioned	 contacts	 with	 The	 Left	 in	 Luxembourg	 and	 but	
particularly	close	contacts	with	the	French	Communist	Party	in	setting	the	agenda.	In	striking	contrast,	
the	Dutch	far-right	parties	refused	any	such	links.	In	Leader	of	Livable	Rotterdam	Marco	Pastors’	words:	
‘There	 is	suspicion	of	 racism.	 It	 is	difficult	 to	align	yourself	with	other	countries’	movements,	 they	are	
extreme	right’.4		
Institutional	 linkages	 were	 more	 visible	 and	 prominent	 in	 the	 analysis	 of	 the	 left-wing	 civil	
society	 groups.	 The	 strong	 anti-globalization	 network	 in	 Europe	 provided	 an	 opportunity	 for	 these	
groups	 to	 come	 together,	 analyze	 the	 new	 developments,	 and	 form	 positions.	 The	 left-wing	 activists	
frequently	referred	to	the	Association	for	the	Taxation	of	Financial	Transactions	for	the	Aid	of	Citizens	
(ATTAC)	network,	and	the	European	Social	Forum	(ESF)	as	important	platforms.	The	ESF	meetings	bring	





ESF	 meetings,	 and	 the	 temporary	 European	 No	 Campaign	 (ENC)	 network	 established	 by	 British	
businessmen	at	 the	 time.6	 The	 ENC	was	 a	 Europe-wide,	 independent,	 cross-party	 network	of	 political	
parties	 and	NGOs	which	 brought	 together	 both	 right	 and	 left-wing	No	 campaigners.	 It	was	 set	 up	 to	
coordinate	 ‘anti-EU	Constitution’	activities,	and	maximize	 the	No	vote	 in	every	EU	 referendum	on	 the	
TCE.		
Importantly,	 the	 anti-globalization	 network	 circulated	 the	 French	 analysis	 of	 the	 TCE,	 not	 the	






preparation	 for	 the	campaign	they	 first	 read	about	 the	discussion	 in	France,	and	were	 inspired	by	 the	
French	 debate	 in	 their	 argumentation.	 Through	 this	 institutional	 channel,	 campaigners	 borrowed	
campaign	arguments.		







The	 French	 civil	 society	 campaigners	 confirmed	 that	 the	 ATTAC	 France	 provided	 the	 first	 and	
main	 left-wing	 analysis	 of	 the	 TCE.	 At	 the	 2004	 ESF	 meeting,	 French	 campaigners	 distributed	 their	
analysis	and	the	‘Appeal	of	200’,	signed	by	200	representatives	of	left-wing	groups,	to	all	other	European	
















really	 very	 important	 for	 the	 other	 countries’.	 He	 stressed	 the	 legitimization	 impact	 of	 the	 French	
debate	for	the	Netherlands,	as	it	lent	credence	to	their	arguments	and	contributed	to	their	visibility.		
In	 all	 cases,	 the	 French	 left-wing	 theoretical	 analysis	 of	 the	 TCE	was	 a	 crucial	 source.	 But	 for	
Luxembourg,	diffusion	was	deeper	due	to	the	special	cultural	and	linguistic	connection	between	the	two	
countries.	 Luxembourg’s	main	No	campaigner,	 the	 left-wing	No	Committee,	openly	acknowledged	the	
support	it	received	from	the	French	left-wing	No	campaign.	They	mentioned	the	difficulty	of	organizing	
the	 campaign	 without	 such	 support,	 as	 Luxembourg	 has	 a	 very	 small	 community.	 André	 Kremer,	
coordinator	of	the	Luxembourg	No	Committee	stated	that	in	formulation	of	their	arguments,	they	were	
inspired	by	their	French	contacts’	 intellectual	work.13	Henri	Wehenkel	of	The	Left	added:	 ‘The	analysis	
came	 from	France.	 ...	We	were	 influenced	by	 the	arguments	of	 the	French	activists’.14	Adrien	Thomas	
from	the	National	Union	of	Luxembourgish	Students	(UNEL)	also	explained	that	the	No	Committee	was	
heavily	 influenced	 by	 the	 French	 debate.15	 He	 said:	 ‘We	were	 very	much	 inspired	 by	 the	 French.	We	
were	not	 influenced	by	the	Dutch	because	of	 the	 language’.	Another	No	campaigner,	 the	President	of	
the	Railways	Trade	Union	Nico	Wennmacher,	similarly	noted	that	they	used	the	French	trade	unionists’	
arguments	on	the	subject,	not	that	of	the	Dutch,	as	they	worked	together	in	the	‘Grande	Région’.16			











Party’.17	 Adrien	 Thomas	 from	 the	 UNEL	 explained	 that	 some	 ATTAC	 France	 members	 even	 came	 to	
Luxembourg	 to	 help	 distribute	 flyers	 in	mailboxes.18	 Anne-Marie	 Berny	 from	 the	 ATTAC-LUX	 similarly	
stated	 that	 most	 of	 the	 ATTAC-LUX	members	 were	 in	 fact	 French	 living	 in	 Luxembourg.19	While	 she	
mentioned	that	the	ATTAC	France,	Germany	and	Belgium	helped	them,	she	stressed	that	that	they	have	
been	 in	 regular	 contact	 with	 the	 ATTAC	 France	 throughout	 the	 campaign.	 Furthermore,	 the	 ATTAC	
France	has	financially	contributed	to	the	ATTAC	Luxembourg’s	campaign	to	a	small	extent.20	Therefore,	
the	shared	language	between	France	and	Luxembourg	intensified	the	influence	of	the	anti-globalization	
network	between	these	 two	cases.	Luxembourg’s	No	campaign	adopted	French	arguments	 to	a	 larger	
degree	than	the	Spanish	or	Dutch	campaigns.		
Luxembourgish	 Yes	 campaigners	 referred	 to	 this	 influence	openly.	 Pierre	Gramegna,	Director-
General	 of	 the	 Chamber	 of	 Commerce,	 noted:	 ‘They	 had	 an	 anti-Europe	 network	 that	 they	 have	





















that	 among	 the	 foreign	 residents	 of	 Luxembourg	 French	 forms	 the	 second	 largest	 group	 after	 the	
Portuguese	 (Scuto,	 2009).	 Furthermore,	 regarding	 cross-border	 employment,	 around	 118,385	 cross-
border	employees	come	into	Luxembourg	on	a	daily	basis	from	France,	Germany	and	Belgium	(EURES,	
2005).	 More	 than	 50%	 of	 these	 cross-border	 employees	 come	 from	 France.	 This	 group	 of	 daily	
commuters	 imported	 campaign	 themes	 from	 abroad.	 Tom	 Graas,	 then	 director	 of	 the	 Luxembourg	
Television	and	Radio	(RTL)	television	news,	explained	that	the	French	commuters	had	a	big	influence	as	
the	discussions	were	carried	everywhere	from	offices	to	restaurants.24		
The	 second	 community	 contributing	 to	 personal	 connections	 is	 the	 mobile	 students.	 The	





their	 classes	 were	 over.26	 Most	 Luxembourgish	 students	 who	 were	 actively	 involved	 in	 the	 French	
campaign	were	also	involved	in	the	Luxembourgish	campaign.	Thomas	explained	that	the	No	Committee	
was	inspired	by	the	French	also	through	the	ATTAC	Campus	network:		
The	UNEL	had	 its	main	base	 in	 Paris	 in	 2005.	…	We	attended	 the	ATTAC	Campus	meetings,	
where	 the	 Constitution	 was	 discussed.	We	 took	 notes.	 Building	 on	 those	 notes	 and	 on	 the	



















My	 Spanish	 interviewees	 mentioned	 the	 lack	 of	 a	 common	 language	 as	 a	 problem	 blocking	
further	cooperation.	 José	Manuel	Fernández	Fernández	of	 the	 IU	explained	 that	 from	the	other	 three	
countries,	 they	 only	 invited	 a	 few	 campaigners	 who	 spoke	 Spanish	 to	 contribute	 to	 the	 Spanish	
campaign.27	 Similarly	Carlos	Girbau	Costa,	 from	 the	 Social	 Forum	and	 the	 IU,	 pointed	 to	 the	different	
cultures	of	north	and	south	Europe	and	mentioned	that	the	Netherlands	and	Luxembourg	were	far	from	








Similarly,	 my	 Dutch	 interviewees	 were	 aware	 that	 the	 Luxembourgish	 campaigners	 and	 the	
public	followed	the	French	debate	more	than	the	Dutch	debate.	Willem	Bos,	President	of	the	left-wing	
civil	 society	 group	ConstitutionNo,	 said:	 ‘The	 French	 campaign	 affected	 Luxembourg,	 not	 the	Dutch.	 I	
was	 invited	 to	 Luxembourg	 by	 The	 Left	 during	 their	 campaign.	 They	 invited	 mainly	 French	 speaking	
politicians	 from	 France	 though’.30	 Member	 of	 the	 ConstitutionNo	 Erik	 Wesselius,	 who	 visited	
Luxembourg	during	their	campaign,	also	confirmed	this	pattern:	‘I	did	not	go	to	France.	...	My	French	is	
not	 that	 good.	 ...	 In	 Luxembourg	 there	 were	 people	 from	 France	 going	 and	 leafleting	 at	 doors.	 It	 is	
easier,	they	share	the	language.	It	would	make	no	sense	to	get	a	Frenchmen	here	to	campaign,	there	is	
too	 much	 cultural	 difference.’.31	 International	 Secretary	 of	 the	 PvdA	 Marije	 Laffeber	 added:	 ‘The	
relationship	between	the	Netherlands	and	France	 is	okay	 ...	but	we	are	not	having	 the	same	debates.	
France	has	more	of	a	Latin	culture,	we	have	been	Protestant	for	centuries,	and	they	have	been	Catholic.	




In	 France,	 indeed,	 the	 interviewees	 highlighted	 this	 factor	 as	 a	 facilitator	 of	 cooperation	with	
Luxembourg.	Pierre	Khalfa	from	the	ATTAC	explained	that	they	had	invited	people	from	other	countries	
only	 if	 they	 spoke	 French.34	 Similarly	 Yves	 Salesse,	 the	 co-President	 of	 the	 Copernic	 Foundation,	



















to	 Luxembourg	 to	 defend	 a	 position	 that	 was	 contrary	 to	 that	 democratically	 adopted	 by	 the	





presence	 of	 campaign	 arguments	 from	 the	 other	 states.	 Once	 again,	 these	 transfers	 go	 beyond	 the	
campaigners	and	reach	voters	as	well.	Among	the	2005	TCE	referendums,	only	Luxembourg	and	France	
shared	media	channels.	 Luxembourgers	 receive	French	 television	channels	and	newspapers	on	a	daily	
basis.	 Regarding	 television,	 the	 local	 broadcaster	 RTL	 operates	 six	 channels,	 but	 only	 one	 in	
Lëtzebuergesch	(Stell,	2006).	The	national	television	channel	airs	only	from	6pm	to	8pm,	while	the	rest	






French	 referendum	campaign	 itself	was	 covered	 remarkably	 in	 the	media:	 ‘I	 think	 that	 if	we	had	had	
another	referendum	before	the	French,	we	would	have	seen	a	Yes	of	80%.’38		
Both	the	Yes	and	No	campaigners	 (18	out	of	21)	 in	Luxembourg	mentioned	that	Luxembourgers	
received	most	of	 the	discussion	on	 the	subject	 from	other	countries	because	of	 the	 limited	airtime	of	
the	 RTL.	 Abbes	 Jacoby,	 Secretary	 General	 of	 The	 Greens’	 Parliamentary	 Group,	 said:	 ‘In	 Luxembourg	
people	 get	 informed	 not	 only	 from	 national	 news	 but	 also	 from	 TV	 stations	 of	 France,	 Germany	 and	
Belgium.	 ...	 We	 also	 get	 French	 newspapers.	 ...	 The	 background	 information	 they	 get	 is	 not	 from	
Luxembourg,	but	from	other	places’.39	François	Biltgen,	Chairman	of	the	Christian	Social	People's	Party	
(CSV)	 and	 the	 Minister	 of	 Labor	 and	 Employment,	 similarly	 stated	 that	 the	 referendum	 debate	 in	
Luxembourg	 became	 largely	 run	 by	 foreign	 press	 due	 to	 the	 French	 influence.40	 Thus,	 the	 debate	 in	
Luxembourg	was	 significantly	 exposed	 to	 the	 ‘French	 reading’	 of	 the	 subject.	 CSV	MP	 Laurent	Mosar	






people	watch	 TV,	 hear	 something	 on	 liberalization	 of	 public	 services	 and	 think	 that	 this	 is	
happening	in	Luxembourg	too.	










adding	 that	 ‘people	did	not	 follow	 the	Dutch	debate	 as	 there	was	no	 language	 connection’.42	 Charles	
Goerens,	 Democratic	 Party	 (DP)	MP,	 also	 explained	 that	 although	 the	Netherlands	was	 their	 first	 ally	
after	WW2,	their	culture	was	closer	to	France	and	that	people	watched	French	television,	finding	Dutch	
less	 understandable.43	 Similarly,	 LSAP	 MP	 Ben	 Fayot	 highlighted	 the	 importance	 of	 the	 French	 No	
campaign	websites,	 which	 Luxembourgers	 followed	 closely.44	While	 such	media	 exposure	might	 be	 a	





Diffusion	 matters	 because	 strategic	 arguments	 are	 shown	 to	 affect	 public	 opinion.	 Even	 though	
Luxembourg	approved	the	referendum,	as	opposed	to	the	outcome	in	France,	it	is	important	to	look	at	
the	Luxembourgish	percentages	closely.	The	No	vote	 intentions	went	 from	a	very	 low	 initial	 level	 to	a	
significant	 43%,	 which	 is	 remarkable	 for	 the	 highly	 pro-EU	 Luxembourg.	 A	 TNS-ILRES	 study	 found	
interesting	 evidence	 of	 diffusion.45	 During	 the	 focus	 group	 meetings,	 where	 people	 were	 asked	 to	
elaborate	 on	 their	 reasons	 to	 vote	 positively	 or	 negatively,	 Luxembourgers	 confused	 Luxembourgish	









geographical	 distribution	 of	 the	 negative	 vote	 supports	 the	 argument.	 Of	 the	 nine	 communes	 of	
Luxembourg	that	voted	against	the	TCE,	seven	of	them	are	located	right	at	the	border	with	France.46			
Yet,	 understanding	 whether	 borrowed	 arguments	 influenced	 referendum	 results	 requires	











order	 appears	 to	 be	 the	main	 factor	 designating	 French	 campaign	 as	 the	 source	 because	 the	 French	
campaigners	were	the	ones	that	prepared	the	first	analysis	of	the	TCE.	In	the	modular	action	literature,	
McAdam	 (1995)	 distinguishes	between	 initiator	movements,	which	 set	 a	 protest	 cycle	 in	motion,	 and	
spin	 off	 movements,	 which	 are	 sparked	 by	 the	 initiators.	 Similarly,	 the	 policy	 transfer	 literature	
highlights	 the	 dominance	 of	 the	 United	 States	 in	 the	 transfer	 of	 election	 strategies	 due	 to	 its	 global	
ideological	hegemony	(Dolowitz	et	al.,	1999;	Needham,	2010).	An	important	question	is	whether	there	is	
an	element	of	size	as	well	(e.g.	Linos,	2011;	Ramos	et	al.,	2007).	Would	Luxembourg	be	able	to	serve	as	









	In	 contrast	with	 the	 assumption	 in	most	 social	 scientific	 analyses,	 cases	 are	 not	 always	 independent	
from	each	 other.	However,	 diffusion	 depends	 on	 the	 existence	 of	 channels.	 The	 degree	 to	which	 the	
campaigners	are	in	contact,	discuss	campaign	themes,	and	borrow	from	one	another	depends	on	these	
channels.	 Collaborative	 networks	 exist	 all	 around	 in	 Europe	 and	 facilitate	 ‘shallow’	 diffusion	 between	
campaigners	 by	 providing	 platforms	 to	meet	 and	 share	 campaign-related	 information.	Nonetheless,	 a	










referendums	before	 Luxembourg,	 these	 states	would	probably	have	had	a	 similar	 impact	as	 they	also	
share	 peculiar	 diffusion	 channels	 with	 Luxembourg.	 Focus	 group	 data	 showed	 that	 Luxembourgers	






Sweden,	and	Norway	 in	 their	accession	referendums.	Similarly,	 in	 the	 first	 Irish	 referendum	on	Lisbon	
treaty	in	2008,	Holmes	(2008)	highlights	the	UK’s	influence	on	Ireland	via	common	media	channels.	The	
UK	 Independence	 Party	 has	 even	 visited	 Ireland	 on	 several	 occasions	 during	 the	 Lisbon	 campaigns,	
participating	actively	in	the	Irish	debate	and	distributing	leaflets	advising	a	No	vote.	My	interview	data	
also	 shows	 some	 collaboration	 among	 the	Dutch,	 French	 and	 Irish	No	 campaigners	 via	 the	 EP	 groups	
during	 the	 same	 period.49	 Diffusion	 effects	 can	 be	 observed	 across	 Europe,	 thus	 analyzing	 cross-case	
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States	that	were	
connected	via	this	
channel	
Number	of	interviewees		
who	mentioned	the	
importance	of	this	channel	
Shared	language/culture	
	
France-Luxembourg	 59	out	of	85	
Common	media	channels	
	
France-Luxembourg	 28	out	of	85	
Collaborative	networks	
	
EP	groups	 All	four	states	 73	out	of	85	
	
	
Anti-globalization	network		 All	four	states	
Ad	hoc	European	networks	 All	four	states	
Mobile	communities	 France-Luxembourg	
Table	1:	Diffusion	channels		
	
	
	
	
	
